

CHAPTER LIII.

THE SECOND THREE MONTHS OF NAVAL WAR.

LORD FISHER AT THE ADMIRALTY—TSING-TAU AND THE JAPANESE NAVY—THE GERMAN LOSSES—
CAREER AND END OF THE EMDEN—THE COCOS-KEELING ACTION—ACTION OFF THE COAST OF CHILE
—LOSS OF GOOD HOPE AND MONMOUTH—VICTORY OFF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS—END OF VON
SPEE'S SQUADRON—ADMIRAL STURDEE'S DISPATCH—MINOR OPERATIONS—EAST AFRICA—KONIGS-
BERG IN RUFIGI RIVER—WEST AFRICA—RED SEA—PERSIAN GULF—THE GOEBEN IN THE BLACK
SEA—TORPEDOING OF MESSUDIYEH BY B 11 IN THE DARDANELLES—BRITISH LOSSES IN HOME
WATERS—BULWARK AND FORMIDABLE—RAIDS AND COUNTER-RAIDS—YARMOUTH, SCARBOROUGH
AND CUXHAVEN—ADMIRAL BEATTY'S ACTION IN THE NORTH SEA—SINKING OF THE BLUCHER.

ON October 29, 1914, Prince Louis of Battenberg was succeeded in the office of First Sea Lord by Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone.

Of the reasons which caused the resignation of Prince Louis there is no occasion to write; but that fine seaman and most able tactician carried with him in his retirement the good wishes and the admiration of the whole service, of which he had so long been an ornament. Lord Fisher was now called upon by his country to wield the weapons that he had had so large a share in bringing into being.

During the second three months of the war events of great importance happened in the North Sea, but the main feature of this period was the practical completion of the task of destroying Germany's naval forces in the outer seas. To the taking of Tsing-Tau had to be added the destruction of the naval force which had been based upon that Eastern stronghold. Its ultimate fate was sure, but its existence constituted a menace to commerce and involved risks and responsibilities which directly and indirectly affected the whole work of the British Navy. Tsing-Tau was from the beginning of German occupation administered by the German Admiralty, not by the Colonial Office, and the cost was a charge upon the Navy, not the Colonial, Estimates. It was, in fact, above all a naval base, and the home of the German "East Asiatic" squadron. This

force consisted of the armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the light cruisers Emden, Nürnberg and Leipzig, four gunboats and two destroyers. As will be seen, the cruisers did not remain to be destroyed at Tsing-Tau, and their careers and fates are the central features of the ensuing narrative.

The full story of the fate of Tsing-Tau has been told in Chapter XLIV. We must now describe briefly the work of the Japanese Navy, which assisted the fleets of the Allies so materially by clearing the waters in the vicinity of its own shores, and which afterwards cooperated in the convoy of troops from the Dominions and in hauling down the German flag in the islands of the Pacific.


It was not until August 23, 1914, that Japan broke off diplomatic relations with Germany and declared war; but as soon as this happened our Far-Eastern Allies acted with the promptitude and startling efficiency that we have learned to expect from them when warlike operations have to be undertaken. The First Fleet, under the command of Admiral Baron Dewa, strung itself out on a line from the Shantung Promontory in the Yellow Sea to the Chusan Archipelago in the Eastern Sea; while the Second Fleet, under the command of Admiral Kato, had by August 27 spread itself in front of the Bay of Kiao-Chau—in which Tsing-Tau is situated—and had established as close a blockade of that port as modern con-

ditions of sea warfare permit. The objective of the Japanese was, naturally, the German Far-Eastern Squadron, but von Spee, the Admiral in command of this force, succeeded in hiding himself and his cruisers somewhere in the south of the China Sea.

The Japanese Fleets remained on their stations as described until the end of August, when the transportation of the army destined for the capture of Tsing-Tau began. The First Fleet took up a position in Southern Korean waters, while a squadron of the Second Fleet, cruising in the Yellow Sea, rendered assistance to the men-of-war convoying the transports. Rear-Admiral Kamimura's Squadron, cooperating with the detachment from the Port Arthur naval station, assisted in the landing of troops at Lunkiang. While these movements were in progress—they lasted till September 13—a detachment under the direct command of Admiral Kato, Commander-in-Chief of the Second Squadron, with the Tochinai and Okada detachments and a further contingent specially commissioned for this service, concentrated on Kiao-Chau Bay and the immediate vicinity. In spite of extremely bad

weather, gale succeeding to gale, the mine sweepers worked almost uninterruptedly to clear the sea in front of the point where the second detachment of the army was to be landed. Scouting was also kept up by means of aircraft, and eventually the enemy was cut off from all communication by way of the sea.

When, in September, the transportation of the second portion of the army was begun, the First Fleet was employed again in convoying the transports; the Kamimura and Port Arthur detachments assisted in the landing of troops at Laoshan Bay, while the main force of the Second Fleet, which was now able to operate inshore owing to the success of the mine sweeping, cooperated with the land forces in bombarding the fortresses on the right wing of the line of the enemy. In this operation the Kamimura and Port Arthur detachments assisted. The Marine Batteries which were working with the besieging army opened fire on October 14 upon the enemy warships in the harbour, and having rendered them useless, turned their attention to the bombardment of Tsing-Tau fort. On October 31 a general cannonade was begun, and on November 7 the



THE INDIAN OCEAN.



LANDING PARTY ABOUT TO RETURN TO THE "EMDEN" AFTER DESTROYING THE WIRELESS STATION AT COCOS-KEELING ISLANDS.

fortress surrendered. The British battleship *Triumph* and the destroyer *Usk* cooperated with the Second Fleet and took part in the blockado as well as in the bombardment.

During these operations there were lost the old light cruiser *Takachico*, 3,700 tons, date 1885, the destroyer *Shiratai*, torpedo boat No. 33, and three specially commissioned steamers. On the enemy's side there were either sunk or destroyed, the Austrian cruiser *Kaiserin Elizabeth*, five gunboats (the *Cormoran*, *Iltis*, *Jaguar*, *Tiger* and *Luchs*), and two destroyers.

This satisfactory action was only a part of the activity displayed by the Japanese. On the outbreak of hostilities Japan's Third Fleet was sent to protect the trade route from the Southern Seas, through Chinese waters, until one of its units came into touch with the guardship at the Makoh Naval Station in Korea. Although by the beginning of November all enemy ships had been cleared out of Far-Eastern waters, as far as was known, still this surveillance was kept up. A detachment of this squadron detailed for operations in the Southern Seas proceeded to Singapore on August 26 and carried on operations in concert with the British Eastern Squadron. At first nothing was known of the movements of the enemy in these regions, and the work consisted of general surveillance and supervision of important ports. When the *Emden* became

active in the eastern portion of the Indian Ocean the detachment assisted in the hunt for that elusive cruiser, and on October 25 a reinforcement under Vice-Admiral Tochinai was dispatched to the scene, and on November 9 the *Emden* was destroyed at the Cocos-Keeling Islands by H.M. Australian cruiser *Sydney*.

When hostilities began certain ships of the enemy were at large in the Pacific in the neighbourhood of Hawaii; but it was not known where they were, nor what was the position of the squadron that had escaped from Far-Eastern waters. A squadron of the First Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy was accordingly told off to hunt the enemy on the trade route between Japan and North America. No trace of German ships could be found, so the squadron occupied itself usefully by taking possession of those places in the sun which Germany had seized in the Pacific in her efforts to form a greater Germany beyond the sea.

One of the ships of the German Far-Eastern Squadron that escaped the attentions of the Japanese in these waters was the light cruiser *Emden*. Allusion has already been made to her in a previous chapter, but it remains to tell the story of her destruction. The resourcefulness of the captain of this ship has often been dwelt upon, but it was probably never displayed to greater advantage than when she left Kiao-Chau. There was every chance of



[La Fayette.]

CAPTAIN JOHN C. T. GLOSSOP,
of H.M.S. "Sydney."

her being met by a Japanese vessel, with whom she could not hope to come to action with success. The expected happened, and shortly after leaving the anchorage she fell in with a Japanese armoured cruiser. But it was not the three-funnelled Emden under the black, white and red German man-of-war ensign that passed the enemy warship; but a vessel with four funnels, flying the British white ensign, whose crew, as she steamed by the Japanese, lined the rails and gave her three hearty British cheers. Much may be forgiven to seamen as clever as this.

In the Bay of Bengal the Emden took and sank between September 10 and September 14 the Indus (3,413 tons), the Lovat (6,102 tons), the Killin (3,544 tons), the Diplomat (7,615 tons), and the Trabboch (4,028 tons). On September 12 the Kabinga, of 4,657 tons, was taken and released. On September 14 the Clan Matheson, of 4,775 tons, was sunk. On September 30 there were taken and sunk the King Lud (3,650 tons), the Foyle (4,147 tons), the Ribera (3,500 tons), and the Tymeric (3,314 tons). On the same date the Buresk (4,350 tons) was captured, and the Gryfevale (4,437 tons) was taken and released. The Pontoporos, taken by the Emden, was released by H.M.S. Yarmouth on October 16. On October 20 were taken and sunk the Troilus

(7,562 tons), the Clan Grant (3,948 tons), the Benmohr (4,806 tons), the Chilkana (5,220 tons), and the Ponrabbel (473 tons). On the same date the Exford (4,542 tons) and the Saint Egbert (5,596 tons) were captured but not sunk. Thus some 70,000 tons of British shipping were destroyed in seven weeks; it is fortunate indeed for the Empire that other commerce raiders were not so successful.


Some further exploits of the Emden are described in the following extracts from a log kept by one of her petty officers:

September 22.—This night off Madras. One of the crew had worked there, and he informed the captain of the oil tanks situated at entrance to harbour. At 9.30 p.m. Emden crept in, turned searchlights on to tanks, and fired two broadsides to find the range. Searchlights then shut off, and 125 shells fired in salvos, some hitting a ship. Tanks set on fire, and tremendous blaze arose. Emden retired at full speed to north-east. Shore batteries opened fire, but shells fell short, and none hit the Emden.

September 23.—This morning the glare of the fire at Madras could still be seen on the horizon, though about 100 miles away. Emden sailed north-east to give impression that she was going towards Calcutta, but when out of sight turned southwards round the east coast of Ceylon.


October 10.—Visited island of Diego Garcia, in the middle of the Indian Ocean, about half-way between Africa and Sumatra. The few European families here had not yet heard of the war, as they only get a steamer in three months. Emden coaling all day. Some of the engineers repaired the local motor-boat, and were given baskets of coconuts and fish.

October 28.—At 4 a.m., 10 miles outside Penang, extra funnel hoisted to make the Emden appear like British cruisers. From the entrance of the harbour at 5 a.m. could be seen in the distance several ships, and well in front of them an unknown cruiser. On steaming in to a range of about 600 yards, this was found to be the Russian cruiser Jemtchug. The Emden fired two torpedoes, the first hitting the cruiser just under the after funnel, whereupon she was seen to sink about 4 feet. The second, fired at closer range, struck just under the bridge, when a terrible explosion occurred. During this time the Emden fired salvo after salvo—in all 100 shots. The Jemtchug fired a few shots, some of which hit ships in the harbour behind the Emden, but none hit the Emden. The Emden had no idea that the Russian cruiser would be in Penang, but expected to find the French cruiser Dupleix and the French destroyer Mousquet. The Mousquet was on patrol duty outside the harbour, and was afterwards reported to have seen the Emden, but thought she was a British cruiser. The Emden had now turned, and was leaving the harbour at full speed. Thirty miles out she met a steamer. On approaching it she hoisted the red flag, meaning that she was a powder steamer. The stranger, which was the British steamer Glenturret, had signalled the shore for a pilot, and the launch had just reached her. The Emden had got out her boats when a warship appeared on the horizon. The Emden immediately ordered her boats to return, and made off, as the warship appeared to be a large one. This was, however, only the effect of the early morning *mirage*. As the ships closed at about 3,800 yards the stranger was found to be the French destroyer Mousquet. The Emden opened fire. The first few shots hit the Mousquet's engine-room, and after several salvos the Emden ceased fire, expecting the Frenchman to be wrecked and to surrender. Instead, the Mousquet went on firing about 10 shots. None,



THE LAST OF THE "EMDEN"

Left top corner: Deck of the "Emden" after the battle: right top and centre: "Emden's" crew removing stores at Cocos-Keeling Islands; bottom: the "Emden" aground.



SKETCH ILLUSTRATING THE FIGHT BETWEEN H.M.S. "SYDNEY" AND THE "EMDEN."

The numbers denote corresponding relative positions.

however, hit the Emden, although some fell 150 yards in front of her. The Mousquet's crew afterwards said that they had fired two torpedoes, but the Emden did not see these. The Emden began firing again, and the Mousquet sank, bows first. The Emden ceased fire, and rescued 36 Frenchmen, three of whom died afterwards. This involved delay, and another destroyer was seen approaching from Penang. The Emden at once steamed for the Indian Ocean at full speed. After being chased for four hours by the destroyer the Emden entered a heavy rainstorm, and the destroyer was lost to sight.

The last act in the drama of the Emden took place off the Cocos-Keeling Islands in the Indian Ocean. They are situated in latitude 12 South, some 500 miles south-west of Java Head and Sunda Straits. They were discovered by the English, and consist of a group of coral islets where the coconut palm grows in abundance. They are in possession of Mr. Ross, a descendant of Captain J. C. Ross, who, in the good ship

Borneo, belonging to Hare & Son of London, took possession of the islands and settled here in 1825. When the island of Krakatoa exploded like a bomb in the year 1883, and altered all the topography of Sunda Straits, ashes and pumice floated feet thick on the surface of the Indian Ocean. In spite of the remoteness of Cocos-Keeling from the scene of the explosion, 500 miles at least, the lagoons in Cocos were so choked with the floating pumice as actually to reclaim a portion of them.

It was to this desolate spot in the Indian Ocean that Captain von Müller brought his ship in the early days of November; with him was one of his captures, the Buresk, which was full of coal. The object of this visit of the Emden was the destruction of the important wireless


station that is established on the islands, and on the morning of November 9 the officials in charge were unpleasantly surprised by the landing of an armed boat's crew from a cruiser which had come to an anchor, and which they first imagined to be H.M.S. Minotaur. They were quickly undeceived by the German officer in charge of the party, who informed them that their operations from the wireless station had greatly hampered the movements of the cruiser. One detachment of the Germans then rounded up all the officials and their servants, placing them under a strict guard, while a second party prepared to blow up the wireless installation and to smash the instrument rooms of the cable office. This they did most thoroughly, but the officials seem to have kept their heads in the most praiseworthy manner, as, just as soon as they discovered that the enemy was upon them, they sent out distress signals by wireless, and warned adjacent stations by cable that they were about to be smashed up. The landing party now blew up the wireless mast and the store in which spare cable and cable gear was kept; a third explosion wrecked the wireless hut and completed the destruction of the installation. The dynamo rooms and workshops were destroyed with flogging hammers and axes, everything breakable, including clocks, being smashed to atoms. Their next proceeding was to cut the shore ends of the submarine cables,

and this was done in full view of the prisoners. There are three cables from the Cocos—to Perth, to Batavia, and to Rodriguez—and the pleasure of the prisoners can be imagined when they saw the Germans spend much hard labour in destroying a dummy cable. Eventually the Perth cable and the dummy were cut, the others being left, presumably because the Germans did not know that they existed.


The party from the Emden had landed at 7.30 a.m., and by 9.20 their mission of destruction was accomplished. At this time a signal was blown on the siren from the ship; the officer in command collected his men, marched them down to the beach, and re-embarked. The telegraphists report that they were fairly and courteously treated. On arrival the Emden was still using her now famous fourth funnel, a dummy, and this it was that caused the telegraphists to mistake her in the first instance for the Minotaur, which is a four funnelled armoured cruiser. As she steamed away in the bright light of the tropic morning for what was so shortly to prove her last cruise, the Emden hauled down and stowed away her dummy.

The action that ensued between the Sydney and the Emden is here given in the official dispatch of Captain Glossop, dated from Colombo on November 15 :

I have the honour to report that whilst on escort duty with the convey under the charge of Captain Silver,



OIL TANKS AT MADRAS.




THE CORONEL AND FALKLAND ACTIONS.

H.M.A.S. Melbourne, at 6.30 a.m. on Monday, November 9, a wireless message from Cocos was heard reporting that a foreign warship was off the entrance. I was ordered to raise steam for full speed at 7.0 a.m. and proceeded thither. I worked up to 20 knots, and at 9.15 a.m. sighted land ahead and almost immediately the smoke of a ship, which proved to be H.I.G.M.S. Emden, coming out towards me at a great rate. At 9.40 a.m. fire was opened, she firing the first shot. I kept my distance as much as possible to obtain the advantage of my guns. Her fire was very accurate and rapid to begin with, but seemed to slacken very quickly, all casualties occurring in this ship almost immediately. First the foremost funnel of her went, secondly the foremast, and she was badly on fire aft, then the second funnel went, and lastly the third funnel, and I saw she

was making for the beach on North Keeling Island, where she grounded at 11.20 a.m. I gave her two more broadsides and left her to pursue a merchant ship which had come up during the action.

2. Although I had guns on this merchant ship at odd times during the action I had not fired, and as she was making off fast I pursued and overtook her at 12.10, firing a gun across her bows, and hoisting International Code Signal to stop, which she did. I sent an armed boat, and found her to be the s.s. Buresk, a captured British collier, with 18 Chinese crew, 1 English steward, 1 Norwegian cook, and a German prize crew of 3 officers, 1 warrant officer and 12 men. The ship unfortunately was sinking, the Kingston knocked out and damaged to prevent repairing, so I took all on board, fired four shells into her, and returned to Emden, passing men



VALPARAISO HARBOUR.

The "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" in the distance on the left.

swimming in the water, for whom I left two boats I was towing from Buresk.

3. On arriving again off Emden, she still had her colours up at mainmast head. I inquired by signal, International Code, "Will you surrender?" and received a reply in Morse, "What signal? No signal books." I then made in Morse, "Do you surrender?" and subsequently, "Have you received my signal?" to neither of which did I get an answer. The German officers on board gave me to understand that the captain would never surrender, and therefore, though very reluctantly, I again fired at her at 4.30 p.m., ceasing at 4.35, as she showed white flags and hauled down her ensign by sending a man aloft.

4. I then left Emden and returned and picked up the Buresk's two boats, rescuing two sailors (5.0 p.m.), who had been in the water all day. I returned and sent in one boat to Emden, manned by her own prize crew from Buresk and one officer, and stating I would return to their assistance next morning.

5. I lay on and off all night, and communicated with Direction Island at 8.0 a.m., November 10, to find that the Emden's party, consisting of three officers and 40 men, one launch and two cutters, had seized and provisioned a 70-ton schooner (the *Ayesha*), having four Maxims with two belts to each. They left the previous night at six o'clock. The wireless station was entirely destroyed, one cable cut, one damaged and one intact. I borrowed a doctor and two assistants, and proceeded as fast as possible to Emden's assistance.

6. I sent an officer on board to see the captain, and in view of the large number of prisoners and wounded and lack of accommodation, etc., in this ship, and the absolute impossibility of leaving them where they were, he agreed that if I received his officers and men and all wounded, "then as for such time as they remained in Sydney they would cause no interference with ship or fittings, and would be amenable to the ship's discipline." I therefore set to work at once to tranship them—a most difficult operation, the ship being on weather side of island and the send alongside very heavy. The conditions in the Emden were indescribable. I received the last from her at 5.0 p.m., then had to go round to the lee side to pick up 20 more men who had managed to get ashore from the ship.

7. Darkness came on before this could be accomplished, and the ship again stood off and on all night, resuming operations at 5.0 a.m. on November 11, a cutter's crew having to land with stretchers to bring wounded round to embarking point. A German officer, a doctor, died ashore the previous day. The ship in the meantime ran over to Direction Island to return their doctor and assistants, send cables, and was back again at 10.0 a.m., embarked the remainder of wounded, and proceeded for Colombo by 10.35 a.m. Wednesday, November 11.

8. Total casualties in Sydney: Killed, 3; severely wounded (since dead), 1; severely wounded, 4; wounded, 4; slightly wounded, 4. In the Emden I can only approximately state the killed at 7 officers and 108 men from captain's statement. I had on board 11 officers, 9 warrant officers and 191 men, of whom 3 officers and 53 men were wounded, and of this number 1 officer and 3 men have since died of wounds.

9. The damage to Sydney's hull and fittings was surprisingly small; in all about 10 hits seem to have been made. The engine and boiler rooms and funnels escaped entirely.

10. I have great pleasure in stating that the behaviour of the ship's company was excellent in every way, and with such a large proportion of young hands and people under training it is all the more gratifying.

It will be seen from Captain Glossop's dispatch that he was on escort duty with the convoy under the charge of Captain Silver, of



[Elliott & Fry.]

THE LATE REAR-ADMIRAL SIR CHRISTOPHER CRADOCK.

H.M.A.S. Melbourne. This convoy was carrying Australian and New Zealand troops to the scene of the great conflict in Europe. The act of self-denial on the part of Captain Silver in sending the Sydney to engage the Emden instead of taking that duty upon himself certainly deserves to be noted. This officer denied to himself and to the officers and men under his command the privilege of dealing with the notorious raider, and in so doing he was actuated solely by his high sense of duty and the responsibility that he owed to his country. In his judgment the Sydney was the more suitable ship, so she was sent, and the Melbourne remained with her convoy until the affair was concluded.

ACTION OFF THE COAST OF CHILE.

On Friday, November 6, the Admiralty received "trustworthy information" that an action had been fought on the Chilean coast on Sunday, November 1, between H.M.S. Good Hope, Monmouth, and Glasgow, in company with the armed liner Otranto, under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, and the German vessels Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Leipzig, and Dresden. The following is a description of the vessels that took part in the affair:

GOOD HOPE.—Armoured cruiser of 14,100 tons. Built at Govan and launched in 1901. Length, 515 ft.:

beam, 71 ft.; draught of water, 28 ft. Her armament consisted of two 9·2-inch guns, sixteen 6-inch, twelve 12-pounders, three 3-pounders, two machine guns, and she was also fitted with two torpedo tubes. The 9·2 gun throws a shell of 380 pounds weight, the 6-inch one of 100 pounds weight.

MONMOUTH.—Armoured cruiser of 9,800 tons. Built in Glasgow and completed in 1903. Length, 440 ft.; beam, 66 ft.; draught of water, 24½ ft. Her armament consisted of fourteen 6-inch guns, eight 12-pounders, three 3-pounders, eight machine guns, and two torpedo tubes. Her best speed was 23·9 knots.

GLASGOW.—Light cruiser of 4,800 tons. Built by Fairfield and completed January, 1911. Length, 430 ft.; beam, 47 ft.; draught of water, 15½ ft. Her armament consists of two 6-inch guns, ten 4-inch, four 3-pounders, and two torpedo tubes. Her speed is 25 knots.

OTRANTO.—Of the Orient Line. Twin-screw steamer of 12,190 tons, launched from Workman & Clark's yard at Belfast in 1909. Commissioned August, 1914, as an auxiliary cruiser.

The German armoured cruisers **SCHARNHORST** and **GNEISENAU**, of 11,600 tons, were sister ships, and were completed in 1907. Their length was 449½ ft.; beam, 71 ft.; draught of water, 25 ft. Their armament consisted of eight 8·2-inch guns (weight of projectile 275 pounds), six 6-inch, twenty 24-pounders, four machine guns, and four torpedo tubes.

DRESDEN.—Third-class cruiser, 3,600 tons. Sister ship to the Emden. Completed 1909. Length, 387 ft., beam, 43½ ft.; draught of water, 17¾ ft. She was armed with ten 4·1-inch guns, eight 5-pounders, four machine guns, and two torpedo tubes.

NURNBERG.—Same type and armament as Dresden, but 3,450 tons displacement.

LEIPZIG.—Third-class cruiser, 3,250 tons. Completed 1906. Length, 341 ft.; beam, 43½ ft.; maximum draught, 17½ ft. She was armed with ten 4·1-inch guns, ten 1-pounders, four machine guns, and two torpedo tubes.


The first news that reached this country of this disastrous action was hardly credited in

official circles, and in an official statement the Secretary of the Admiralty stated:

The Admiralty cannot accept these facts as accurate at the present time, for the battleship *Canopus*, which had been specially sent to strengthen Admiral Cradock's squadron, and would give him a decided superiority, is not mentioned in them, and further, although five German ships are concentrated in Chilean waters, only three have come into Valparaiso harbour. It is possible, therefore, that when full accounts of the action are received they may considerably modify the German version.


Unfortunately for official optimism the obsolescent *Canopus** was not with the cruisers in the action. The moral of this battle was the same as that of those by which it was succeeded—that, given reasonably good shooting and skill in the handling, the ship with the better artillery will win any action. The *Good Hope* represented one of the worst and most expensive types of ship ever built for the Navy in modern times. She was an immense target and much under-gunned for her displacement. The *Monmouth*, also of nearly 10,000 tons, carried no gun larger than a 6-inch.

* *CANOPUS*, battleship of 12,950 tons, built at Portsmouth, and completed in 1900. Length, 400 ft.; beam, 74 ft.; draught of water, 26½ ft. Her armament consists of four 12-inch guns (mark 8, 35 calibre, weight of projectile 850 pounds), twelve 6-inch, ten 12-pounders (12 cwt.), two 12-pounders (8 cwt.), six 3-pounders, two Maxims, four torpedo tubes. Speed (when new) 18·5 knots.



I. H.M.S. "MONMOUTH."

II. H.M.S. "GOOD HOPE."



PLAN OF THE ACTION OFF CORONEL.

The comparison of guns in the two squadrons runs thus :

German.	British.
16 8.2-inch	2 9.2-inch
12 6-inch	32 6-inch
30 4.1-inch	10 4-inch
40 24-pounders	20 12-pounders
16 5-pounders	10 3-pounders

The British ships were outclassed, as their 6-inch guns of an old mark were unlikely to inflict damage on the enemy at long ranges, no

matter how well served; while at the same time the comparatively modern 8.2's of the Germans would be finding their target, the gunners being unhampered by the disturbing factor of hits on their own ships. The Scharnhorst had won the gold medal for big-ship shooting presented by the Kaiser, and the Gneisenau was also extremely efficient in gunnery.

On Sunday, November 1, 1914, the Good

Hope, Monmouth and Glasgow came up with the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Leipzig, and Dresden. There was a strong wind and a very considerable sea; both squadrons were steaming to the southward, and the Germans kept out of range and declined action until sunset, when the light gave them an important advantage. Early in the battle, which lasted about two hours, both the Good Hope and Monmouth caught fire, but they continued fighting until nearly dark, when a serious explosion took place in the Good Hope and she foundered. It was stated that the Monmouth hauled off at dark, making water badly, and appeared unable to steam away. We now know, however, that she closed with the enemy with the greatest gallantry with the intention of ramming; that she was sunk in the attempt quite close to the enemy ships; and that although the sea was by no means too bad, no attempt was made to save the English sailors struggling in the water.

On November 17 the Secretary of the Admiralty announced that the following report had been received from Captain John Luce, of H.M.S. Glasgow:

Glasgow left Coronel 9 a.m. on November 1 to rejoin Good Hope (flagship), Monmouth and Otranto at rendezvous. At 2 p.m. flagship signalled that apparently from wireless calls there was an enemy ship to northward. Orders were given for squadron to spread N.E. by E. in the following order: Good Hope, Monmouth, Otranto, and Glasgow, speed to be worked up to

15 knots. 4.20 p.m., saw smoke; proved to be enemy ships, one small cruiser and two armoured cruisers. Glasgow reported to Admiral, ships in sight were warned, and all concentrated on Good Hope. At 5.0 p.m. Good Hope was sighted.


5.47 p.m., squadron formed in line-ahead in following order: Good Hope, Monmouth, Glasgow, Otranto. Enemy, who had turned south, were now in single line-ahead 12 miles off, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau leading. 6.18 p.m., speed ordered to 17 knots, and flagship signalled Canopus, "I am going to attack enemy now." Enemy were now 15,000 yards away, and maintained this range, at the same time jamming wireless signals.

By this time sun was setting immediately behind us from enemy position, and while it remained above horizon we had advantage in light, but range too great. 6.55 p.m., sun set, and visibility conditions altered, our ships being silhouetted against afterglow, and failing light made enemy difficult to see.


7.3 p.m., enemy opened fire 12,000 yards, followed in quick succession by Good Hope, Monmouth, Glasgow. Two squadrons were now converging, and each ship engaged opposite number in the line. Growing darkness and heavy spray of head sea made firing difficult, particularly for main deck guns of Good Hope and Monmouth. Enemy firing salvos got range quickly, and their third salvo caused fire to break out on fore part of both ships, which were constantly on fire till 7.45 p.m. 7.50 p.m., immense explosion occurred on Good Hope amidships, flames reaching 200 ft. high. Total destruction must have followed. It was now quite dark.

Both sides continued firing at flashes of opposing guns. Monmouth was badly down by the bow, and turned away to get stern to sea, signalling to Glasgow to that effect. 8.30 p.m., Glasgow signalled to Monmouth: "Enemy following us," but received no reply. Under rising moon enemy's ships were now seen approaching, and as Glasgow could render Monmouth no assistance, she proceeded at full speed to avoid destruction. 8.50 p.m., lost sight of enemy. 9.20 p.m., observed 75 flashes of fire, which was no doubt final attack on Monmouth.

Nothing could have been more admirable than conduct of officers and men throughout. Though it was



A DESTROYER'S TORPEDO TUBES.



MAP SHOWING POSITION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

most trying to receive great volume of fire without chance of returning it adequately, all kept perfectly cool, there was no wild firing, and discipline was the same as at battle practice. When target ceased to be visible, gunlayers spontaneously ceased fire. The serious reverse sustained has entirely failed to impair the spirit of officers and ship's company, and it is our unanimous wish to meet the enemy again as soon as possible.

The Admiral, the gallant and well-beloved Cradock, had gone to his long home with a guard accompanying him of hundreds of those seamen he had led in action. No end could have been more consonant with his own wishes than that he should die for the country he had served so well.

The Glasgow, sorely battered, stood away out of action to the southward. It was a miracle that she lived to tell the tale; but not only did she do so, but we see from the concluding paragraph of the report of Captain Luce in what manner the action had been viewed by those on board. We are told that owing to internal damage from the fire of the enemy a good deal of strutting with timber had to be resorted to, in order to shore up her decks and stiffen damaged bulkheads. An officer finding his way along the next morning

discovered the following inscription chalked up on one of these struts: "Epping Forest, no Germans admitted on any pretence."

It will be remembered that the cruisers *Aboukir*, *Cressy*, and *Hogue* were sunk in the North Sea by submarines on September 22; and that this feat was received with delirious joy in Germany. The satisfaction on that occasion was nothing to the outburst when the news was received in Berlin of the destruction of Admiral Cradock's two ships. The hated English had once more been defeated on their own element, the sea, and loud were the boastings and the predictions of further disasters in store for the British Navy in the future.

There was no minimising the fact that our arms had received a serious reverse, or that the enemy had legitimate cause for jubilation. Admiral von Spee had not been heard of for nearly six weeks before the battle off the Chilean coast, and his reappearance and success were a mortifying blow to British prestige. The German squadron, as we know, had eluded the Japanese squadrons in the Far East, the *Scharnhorst* and the *Gneisenau* having left Kiao-Chau just before war broke out.

They were not heard of again until September 22, when they arrived off Papeete in the island of Tahiti, where they sank a small and unarmed French gunboat and bombarded the defenceless town. Later on it was discovered that the two vessels had visited Apia harbour on September 14, but had remained only a short time. In October the Leipzig sank a steamer called the Bankfields off Peru, homeward bound from Eten with a cargo of six thousand tons of sugar. In September she sank the oil-tank steamer Elsinore, and in November the Vine Branch, off the Chilean coast, while that vessel was outward bound from England to Guayaquil. The Dresden sank the Hyades off Pernambuco on August 16, while the vessel was bound from the River Plate for Holland with grain, and the Holmwood on August 26 near Santa Maria, on the voyage from South Wales to Bahia Blanca with coals. The Nürnberg cut the cable between Bamfield, British Columbia, and Fanning Island early in September, but there is no record of her having captured anything. The large cruisers do not seem to have gone in for commerce destruction.

THE FALKLAND ISLANDS VICTORY.

High speed in scouting vessels, wireless telegraphy, the aeroplane, the captive balloon, and the dirigible have rendered it increasingly difficult in the twentieth century to conduct warlike operations with anything approaching to secrecy. Not only is the general on land no longer unaware of what is happening on the other side of the hill, but the admiral at sea is overlooked by aircraft when the weather is at all suitable for the purpose. Aircraft, however, have distinct limitations. In ideal weather for the purpose a Zeppelin airship might scout with most satisfactory results in the North Sea, and might even pursue her researches until they included a peep at the harbours on the western shores of Scotland. But the open ocean remains, and, at all events for the present, seems likely to remain, the province of the ship which sails upon its waters. Therefore the problem of coming up with and destroying the squadron of von Spee was a matter that had to be settled without adventitious aid from the firmament of heaven.

Very seldom had retribution followed so



THE KAISER AMONGST HIS SAILORS.



PORT STANLEY, FALKLAND ISLANDS.

[Mrs. Walter.

swiftly on the heels of action as it did on this occasion. The destruction of this German squadron, an imperative necessity from the first, had now to be accomplished in the shortest possible time. Von Spee had signed his own death warrant. First we will set down the bald Admiralty announcement, which runs as follows :


At 7.30 a.m. on December 8 the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau Nürnberg, Leipzig and Dresden were sighted near the Falkland Islands by a British squadron under Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Doveton Sturdee. An action followed, in the course of which the Scharnhorst, flying the flag of Admiral Graf von Spee, the Gneisenau, and the Leipzig were sunk. The Dresden and the Nürnberg made off during the action, and are being pursued. Two colliers were also captured. The Vice-Admiral reports that the British casualties are very few in number. Some survivors have been rescued from the Gneisenau and the Leipzig.

Thirty-eight days only had elapsed between the action in the Pacific and that which took place in the South Atlantic. On November 1 the Monmouth and the Good Hope were sunk by the German squadron ; on December 8 they were followed by their destroyers. The Falkland Islands, where the battle between Sturdee and von Spee took place, are well over 7,000 miles from England ; yet in a little over five weeks from the time of the disaster to Cradock a sufficient force had been dispatched, had found the enemy, and had dealt with him to his entire discomfiture.

During the war a policy of silence was maintained that sometimes proved irksome to the public. A more striking justification of this attitude on the part of the authorities could hardly be found than in the success of the Falkland Islands action. Until it was over no unauthorised person so much as knew that

Vice-Admiral Sturdee was on his way, or indeed that any squadron had been dispatched to deal with the situation. In the upshot the right force arrived at the right place at the right time, thus solving the strategical side of the problem, while its tactical outcome was all that could be desired.

The Governor of the Falkland Islands had heard from the Admiralty that he might expect a raid on the Islands, and had done what he could to prepare for such an eventuality. Women and children by an order dated October 19 were ordered to leave Port Stanley, and in the meantime the men in the island prepared



ADMIRAL STURDEE'S SQUADRON IN PORT STANLEY HARBOUR.

1. "Invincible." 2. "Inflexible." 3. "Carnarvon."
4. "Glasgow." 5. "Kent." 6. "Cornwall."
7. "Bristol." 8. "Macedonia." 9. "Canopus."



SAFEGUARDS AGAINST TORPEDOES.

Putting out nets.

to make the best fight that they could, supposing the enemy were to appear. A wireless message was received on November 3 acquainting the people on the island of the loss of the Good Hope and Monmouth, and this was followed by another from the Glasgow saying that that ship and the Canopus were on their way to the Falklands. The presumption was that these ships were being followed by the victorious Germans. A letter from a lady in the Falkland Islands gave the following description of the state of the Glasgow on arrival :

The Glasgow was very badly damaged, one enormous hole in her side being 3 ft. by 9 ft. Another shell had gone through the side of the ship and through the captain's cabin demolishing his roll-top desk, and giving off such fumes that several men who rushed in to put out the fire were rendered unconscious. There were only four slight casualties, fortunately, and both men and officers said of each other that they were heroes. The Glasgow men said that after the Good Hope sank with Admiral Cradock on board their captain became senior officer. When he found himself damaged, and noticed that the Monmouth was in a similar condition, he signalled to the latter ship to steer a certain course away from the enemy, but received a reply that as the ship was not under control it was impossible to obey the order. He therefore steamed close to the Monmouth, which was in a sinking condition, her bows being under water, with the men assembled in the stern. There was a heavy sea running, the enemy was still firing, and they had to leave the Monmouth to her fate. As the

Glasgow left to seek safety in flight three cheers were raised by the Monmouth, and that was the last they knew of the ship.

Impartial evidence that the British sailors were left to drown by the enemy is that of the German seamen themselves. On arrival at Valparaiso they were asked by a German pastor why none of the English had been saved, and whether it had not been possible to rescue any of them. To this they replied that it would have been quite possible to do so, but that they were not permitted by their officers to hold out a helping hand.

The force at the disposal of Admiral Sturdee comprised the battle cruisers *Invincible* and *Inflexible*, the battleship *Canopus*, the armoured cruisers *Kent* and *Cornwall*, sister ships to the ill-fated *Monmouth*, the armoured cruiser *Carnarvon* (10,850 tons, armed with four 7.5-inch, six 6-inch, two 12-pounders, twenty 3-pounders, and two torpedo tubes), the sister light cruisers *Glasgow* and *Bristol*, and the armed liner *Macedonia*. The *Invincible* and *Inflexible* are two of the three battle-cruisers (the *Indomitable* being the third) which were completed in 1908, and have a displacement of 17,250 tons. Their speed is over 28 knots, and the price of this

increase over the 21 knots of the battleship Dreadnought was the loss of two 12-inch guns and lighter armour—a 7-inch belt amidships instead of an 11-inch, and a 4-in belt forward instead of a 6-inch. Owing to the arrangement of their turrets all their eight 12-inch guns can be fired either to port or starboard.


The details of the German squadron have already been given. It is interesting to note that the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were almost contemporary with the Invincible class, having been completed in 1907, but at that time Germany had not been able to copy and adopt the all-big-gun ship, either as battleship or as battle cruiser.

What information Admiral von Spee had been able to gather concerning enemy movements since the day on which he sank the Good Hope and the Monmouth has never become known, but what is quite certain is that he was unaware of the arrival of the squadron commanded by Admiral Sturdee. It is evident that the German commander was on his way to annex the Falkland Islands, and to use them as his much-needed base. Secrecy and silence were weapons as potent as the guns of Sturdee's squadron, and the nation owes a debt of gratitude to those who succeeded, totally unknown to the enemy,

in getting a powerful squadron away from home waters to the far-distant Falklands—a squadron which arrived exactly in time, and which was thus enabled to clear the southern seas of a menace to British trade and British supremacy.

At the time of the battle between von Spee and Cradock, the Canopus was 200 miles to the southward, and after the action she was picked up by the Glasgow, both ships then proceeding in company to the Falklands, where they arrived on November 8. On the evening of that day a wireless message was received directing them to proceed to Monte Video, and the inhabitants of the colony were left with the pleasing prospect of awaiting the arrival of the victorious German squadron, to which they could offer only such resistance as might be raised locally. Before, however, the two ships arrived at Monte Video, they received a wireless message ordering them to return to the Falklands and help to defend the colony, which they accordingly did; and then, on December 7, to the immense relief of everyone, the Invincible and Inflexible arrived from England, and the other ships from Brazil.

At 8 o'clock on Tuesday morning, December 8, it was reported from the signal station on shore that the look-out on Sapper Hill had



From a photograph by a Naval Officer present.

BOATS FROM THE "INFLEXIBLE" AND "INVINCIBLE" PICKING UP SURVIVORS FROM THE "GNEISENAU."

The "Inflexible" standing by.



VICE-ADMIRAL SIR F. C. DOVETON
STURDEE.

observed a four-funnel and a two-funnel man-of-war steering northwards, and the Kent, which was acting as guard ship in Port William, was at once ordered to weigh anchor, and a few minutes later passed down the harbour to a station at the entrance, while a general signal was made to raise steam for full speed. It was most important to conceal, if possible, from the enemy the fact that two battle cruisers were present, and accordingly those two vessels raised steam with oil fuel. Those who have seen the volumes of black smoke that pour out from the funnels of a ship raising steam with oil fuel will realise how black was the cloud that soon enveloped the harbour.

At 8.20 the signal station reported another column of smoke in sight to the southward, and still another column half an hour later. The Canopus, which was lying in Port Stanley, with the Glasgow and Bristol, the other vessels being in Port William, with the Macedonia at anchor as look-out ship at the mouth of the bay, reported at 8.47 that the first two ships were about 8 miles off, and that the smoke

reported at 8.20 appeared to be that of two ships about 20 miles off.

The subsequent course of events may be given in the words of Admiral Sturdee's dispatch :

At 9.20 a.m. the two leading ships of the enemy (Gneisenau and Nürnberg), with guns trained on the wireless station, came within range of the Canopus, who opened fire at them across the low land at a range of 11,000 yards. The enemy at once hoisted their colours and turned away. At this time the masts and smoke of the enemy were visible from the upper bridge of the Invincible at a range of approximately 17,000 yards across the low land to the south of Port William.

A few minutes later the two cruisers altered course to port, as though to close the Kent at the entrance to the harbour, but about this time it seems that the Invincible and Inflexible were seen over the land, as the enemy at once altered course and increased speed to join their consorts.

The Glasgow weighed and proceeded at 9.40 a.m. with orders to join the Kent and observe the enemy's movements.

At 9.45 a.m. the squadron—less the Bristol—weighed, and proceeded out of harbour in the following order:—Carnarvon, Inflexible, Invincible, and Cornwall. On passing Cape Pembroke Light, the five ships of the enemy appeared clearly in sight to the south-east, hull down. The visibility was at its maximum, the sea was calm, with a bright sun, a clear sky, and a light breeze from the north-west.

At 10.20 a.m. the signal for a general chase was made. The battle cruisers quickly passed ahead of the Carnarvon and overtook the Kent. The Glasgow was ordered to keep two miles from the Invincible, and the Inflexible was stationed on the starboard quarter of the flagship. Speed was eased to 20 knots at 11.15 a.m. to enable the other cruisers to get into station.

At this time the enemy's funnels and bridges showed just above the horizon.

Information was received from the Bristol at 11.27 a.m. that three enemy ships had appeared off Port Pleasant, probably colliers or transports. The Bristol was therefore directed to take the Macedonia under his orders and destroy transports.

The enemy were still maintaining their distance, and I decided, at 12.20 p.m., to attack with the two battle cruisers and the Glasgow.





At 12.47 p.m. the signal to "Open fire and engage the enemy" was made.

The Inflexible opened fire at 12.55 p.m. from her fore turret at the right-hand ship of the enemy, a light cruiser; a few minutes later the Invincible opened fire at the same ship.

The deliberate fire from a range of 16,500 to 15,000 yards at the right-hand light cruiser, who was dropping astern, became too threatening, and when a shell fell close alongside her at 1.20 p.m. she (the Leipzig) turned away, with the Nürnberg and Dresden to the south-west. These light cruisers were at once followed by the Kent, Glasgow, and Cornwall, in accordance with my instructions.

The action finally developed into three separate encounters, besides the subsidiary one dealing with the threatened landing.

Action with the armoured cruisers.—The fire of the battle cruisers was directed on the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. The effect of this was quickly seen, when at 1.25 p.m., with the Scharnhorst leading, they turned about 7 points to port in succession into line-ahead and opened fire at 1.30 p.m. Shortly afterwards speed was eased to 24 knots, and the battle cruisers were ordered to turn together, bringing them into line-ahead, with the Invincible leading.



PART OF ADMIRAL STURDEE'S FLEET.

Top : H.M.S. "Invincible" ; centre left : H.M.S. "Canopus" ; centre right : H.M.S. "Glasgow" -
bottom : H.M.S. "Inflexible."

hour before either the Cornwall or Kent could come up and get within range. During this time the Dresden was able to increase her distance and get out of sight.

The weather changed after 4 p.m., and the visibility was much reduced; further, the sky was overcast and cloudy, thus assisting the Dresden to get away unobserved.

Action with the Enemy's Transports.—A report was received at 11.27 a.m. from H.M.S. Bristol that three ships of the enemy, probably transports or colliers, had appeared off Port Pleasant. The Bristol was ordered to take the Macedonia under his orders and destroy the transports.

H.M.S. Macedonia reports that only two ships, steamships Baden and Santa Isabel, were present; both ships were sunk after the removal of the crew.

I have pleasure in reporting that the officers and men under my orders carried out their duties with admirable efficiency and coolness, and great credit is due to the Engineer Officers of all the ships, several of which exceeded their normal full speed.


In connexion with Admiral Sturdee's tribute to the work of the engineering staffs of the ships, reference may be made to the expedients to which the Kent was put in her chase of the Nürnberg. She was woefully short of fuel, and when it was reported to her captain that the supply of coal was becoming exhausted, he replied, "Very well, then, have a go at the boats." The order was obeyed; the boats were broken up, smeared with oil, and passed into the furnaces. After them went the wooden ladders, the doors, and the chests of drawers from the officers' cabins, and the Kent steamed at 24 knots.

It was on the Kent, also, that Sergeant Charles Mayes performed an act that won him the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal. A shell


burst and ignited some cordite charges in the casemate, and a flash of flame went down the hoist into the ammunition passage. Sergeant Mayes picked up a charge of cordite and threw it away. He then got hold of a firehose and flooded the compartment, extinguishing the fire in some empty shell bags which were burning. The extinction of this fire saved a disaster which might have led to the loss of the ship.

The sinking of the Leipzig is described in the following extracts from a letter from H.M.S. Cornwall:

At about 9 p.m. she loosed off a rocket as a sign of surrender, and so we lowered what boats we could and sent them to her aid. I shall never in all my life forget the sight of that ship going down. All the ship's company had gathered on the foc's'le, and one or two boats were still being lowered when the captain leant over the side of the bridge and said: "It's no good, she's going." The men in the boat which was half lowered stood up and every face was turned towards the blazing ship. You can't imagine what she was like. It was nearly dark, about 9.25 p.m., and the red glare from the flames lit up the remains of what had been the home of some 300 human beings a few hours before. As we saw her then she lay like an inferno on the sea. She had only the veriest stump of her second funnel left. The other two had been knocked completely away. Her mainmast was gone, and the upper half of her foremast. Aft she was blazing like an oil factory, and forward she was also burning furiously. Her ports showed up like faint red circles, and occasional spurts of steam and sparks ascended from her waist. How any ship could have floated like it Heaven alone knows, and how anyone can have lived through it simply astounds me. Suddenly she heeled to port and her stump of a foremast slowly dipped into the water as she sank with scarcely a ripple by the head. There was no cheering or anything



A BATTLESHIP'S GUNS IN ACTION.



GERMAN WARSHIP IN KIEL CANAL.

of that sort. We just stood there in absolute silence, and, personally, I thought of the poor devils who had been chased for five months only to end like that. There is no doubt whatsoever that they fought like heroes. As for ourselves they hit us fair and square eighteen times, and yet we had not one single casualty.

The same writer makes the following general reflections on the engagement :

When one remembers that the action in the Pacific was fought on November 1, and that the German fleet did not appear off the Falklands until December 8, when they were free to have come any day previous to that, and that the British fleet had only arrived twenty-four hours earlier it does seem obvious that our luck was ir. If we had arrived forty-eight hours later and they had arrived twenty-four hours sooner, the Falkland Isles would have been in German hands, and hundreds of lives would have been lost regaining them.

Of course, we had every advantage on our side both in weight of guns and speed and armour, but even so it argues good management on somebody's part to sink four German ships with a loss of over 2,000 Germans as against a British loss of seven or eight killed and four wounded.

It cannot be denied that a satisfactory roundness would have been added to the victory had all the five German ships been sunk, and on this point the comments of the Naval Correspondent of *The Times* may aptly be quoted :

It is not unfair, nor does it detract from the gallantry of Admiral Sturdee, or the skilful manner in which he fought the action, to describe the escape of the Dresden as a regrettable incident. It is explained as being partly due to the fact that the Glasgow, the only light cruiser with sufficient speed to have caught her, engaged the Leipzig before the Cornwall or Kent came up, and during this time the Dresden was able to increase her distance and get out of sight. Moreover, the weather changed about 4 p.m., the visibility was much reduced, and the sky became overcast and cloudy. Her escape

had two unfortunate results. It locked up several ships for her search which could have been otherwise employed, and indirectly led to the loss of a fine Japanese cruiser. We treasure two sayings in the Navy, one of Drake's, who said there was time to finish his game and beat the Spaniards too; and the other of Nelson's—"Now, had we taken ten sail, and had allowed the eleventh to escape when it had been possible to have got at her, I could never have called it well done." It seems quite likely that Admiral Sturdee has since regretted those brilliant hours in the forenoon when he slowed down to enable the other cruisers to get into station. But this matter apart, it was a well-fought action, giving every opportunity for the display of the admirable qualities of all engaged in it.

SOME MINOR OPERATIONS.

One of the most interesting of the minor events of the war at sea was the bottling up and subsequent destruction of the German light cruiser Königsberg in the Rufigi River on the East Coast of Africa in November. This vessel escaped from Dar-es-Salaam at the beginning of the war and did a good deal of mischief among shipping, including the shelling of H.M.S. Pegasus in Zanzibar, when that vessel was laid up repairing boilers and was unable to reply to her fire. Chased by British cruisers she took refuge in the Rufigi River and managed to force her way up stream until she was out of range. As the depth of water was insufficient to permit of her being followed, it was decided to prevent her escape by blocking the channel. A vessel named the Newbridge, with 1,500 tons of coal in her, was requisitioned for this service, and for the trip down from Zanzibar to the river her crew was replaced by naval officers and blue-




SERGEANT CHARLES MAYES,
H.M.S. "Kent."


jackets, though her captain, Captain Willett, remained. The operations were in charge of Lieutenant Lavington of the Pegasus.

The preparations were made with secrecy, but the Germans received notice of what was

intended and got ready accordingly. In order to reach the position where it was proposed to sink her the Newbridge had to pass close to a small island in the mouth of the river, and on this a number of the crew of the Königsberg entrenched themselves with Maxims and quick-firers landed from their ship. The Newbridge went in under her own steam, and the Germans opened fire as soon as she got within range; a seaman was badly peppered with coal dust owing to a shell exploding in a coal bag, but that was the only casualty. Coolly and dexterously the ship was manœuvred into position to block the channel. Bow and stern anchors were let go, and water was admitted to her tanks so that she took a list to port, the object being to sink her with her deck up stream, in such a way that sand might be carried against it by the four-knot tide and promote the rapid silting up of the channel. Then, when all was ready, her crew took to the boats and exploded three charges of guncotton that had been placed in her hold against the outer skin. She sank rapidly. Several casualties occurred in the boats as they passed out under a hot fire from the island, two bluejackets being killed and several wounded. The Duplex, a cable ship which accompanied the Newbridge, had five Lascars killed and a lieutenant R.N.R. severely



HOISTING NAVAL AEROPLANE ON BOARD H.M.S. "HIBERNIA."



GERMAN BATTLESHIP SQUADRON.

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On the other side of Africa, on October 26, a French force under Colonel Mayer, with the cooperation of a British naval and military force, occupied Edea, a town on the Sanaga River, West Africa, and an important station on the railway to Duala. On November 13 preparations were completed for extensive operations to the north and north-west of Duala. After a bombardment by the French cruiser Bruix and the Nigeria Government yacht Ivy, a force of Royal Marines seized and occupied Victoria, the seaport of Buea, the seat of the German Colonial Government. On the same day a column advancing along the Bonaberi railway from Susa drove the enemy north and occupied Mujuka, a station about 50 miles from Bonaberi. Meanwhile large allied naval and military forces, advancing from different points, proceeded to occupy Buea. The occupation was effected on November 15, the enemy being scattered in all directions. A German missionary attempted to blow up H.M.S. Dwarf with an infernal machine, and when asked how he found such an action compatible with his profession replied that he was a soldier first and a missionary afterwards.

About the same time two successful operations were carried out in the Red Sea. In the first of these, against the Turkish garrison at



Sheik Seyd, Indian troops were engaged, assisted by H.M.S. Duke of Edinburgh. According to the official account issued by the Secretary of the Admiralty on November 16, the Turkish fort (Turba) is situated on the rocky heights to the eastward of Cape Bab-el-Mandeb, at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, and is close to the boundary line between Turkish territory and the Aden protectorate. The Sheik Seyd Peninsula consists of a group



[F. N. Birkett.]

FLIGHT COMMANDER
FRANCIS E. T. HEWLETT, R.N.




SERGEANT CHARLES MAYES,
H.M.S. "Kent."


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


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FLIGHT COMMANDER
FRANCIS E. T. HEWLETT, R.N.



BRITISH AEROPLANE RAID ON CUXHAVEN.

of rocky heights joined to the mainland by a low sandy plain, the greater portion of which is covered at high water by a shallow lagoon. The guns of the fort command the isthmus connecting the peninsula with the mainland. Three battalions of troops were landed in face of opposition, but under cover of fire from H.M.S. Duke of Edinburgh, which had previously disabled Turba Fort, and which assisted during the operations. After landing, one and a half battalions of infantry attacked the enemy positions, and were opposed by well-concealed artillery and infantry fire. When the hills commanding Manheli were occupied, opposition weakened, and about 200 of the enemy escaped on camels by the isthmus or in boats by sea. Six of the enemy were reported killed, and the majority of the remainder wounded and prisoners. The forts were occupied by the British forces, and large amounts of munitions of war and six field guns captured. The heavy guns were probably put out of action by the Duke of Edinburgh. The British casualties among the troops were one officer and fifteen men wounded, and four men killed. There were no naval casualties.

In consequence of a report that mines had been sent to Akaba to be laid in the Gulf of Akaba, and possibly in the Red Sea, the cruiser *Minerva* was ordered to proceed to

Akaba to investigate and stop any such action. According to an account published at Cairo on November 17, on arriving at Akaba the captain found it occupied by a small detachment of troops. Negotiations for a surrender were attempted, but were frustrated by German officers present. The *Minerva* was compelled to open fire, but confined her attack to the fort, the post office, and the Government buildings. Later a landing party reconnoitred in the direction of Wadi-el-Ithm, but encountered only a few armed men, who rapidly disappeared. The patrol returned to the town and re-embarked, after posting a proclamation inviting the inhabitants to return and assuring their safety. The town and wells were not damaged, and there were no British casualties.

In the Persian Gulf, as already recorded, successful operations were carried out on November 8 against Fao, at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, by a military force from India covered by H.M.S. *Odin* (Commander Cathcart P. Wason), the armed launch *Sirdar*, a force of marines with a Maxim gun party, and a boat from the Ocean. The guns of the enemy were silenced after an hour's resistance, and the town was occupied by the troops and the naval brigade. There were no naval casualties.

At the end of October the Turkish Fleet, at

the instigation of its German masters, started bombarding undefended coast towns in the Black Sea. The Goeben bombarded Sebastopol and threw 116 shells into the town on November 1, and in answer a combined British and French squadron bombarded the Dardanelles forts at long range at daybreak on November 3. The forts replied, but the Allies suffered no loss, only one projectile falling alongside. A large explosion, accompanied by volumes of black smoke, occurred at Helles fort, but the amount of material damage done could not be estimated. Probably the intention of the attack was not so much to cause damage as to ascertain the range of the guns in the forts.

Nearly three weeks later the Goeben and the Breslau were engaged by the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea. According to the statement of the Naval General Staff at Petrograd, about noon on November 18, when the Russian battleship division was returning from a cruise along the Anatolian coast and was abreast of Sebastopol, it sighted, 25 miles off the Chersonese lightship, the Goeben and the Breslau. The ships immediately took battle formation, and holding a course which placed the enemy to starboard, opened fire at a range of forty cables (*i.e.*, 8,000 yards). The first salvo of the 12-inch guns of the flagship *Evstaffi* hit the Goeben, bursting on the centre of her freeboard and causing a fire on board. The other Russian ships then opened fire, and made excellent practice, a whole series of explosions being noticeable on the Goeben's hull. After some delay the Goeben opened fire with salvos from her big guns, which she concentrated on the Russian flagship. The battle lasted 14 minutes and then the Goeben swiftly changed course, and, thanks to her superior speed,



[Russell, Southsea


LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER
NORMAN D. HOLBROOK, V.C.,
of Submarine B 11.

disappeared in the fog. The Breslau, which had taken no part in the action, remained in the offing. Only slight damage was suffered by the *Evstaffi*. The Russian casualties were four officers and 24 men killed and wounded.

The strength of the Russian squadron on this occasion is not stated, but in any case the Goeben was nearly twice the displacement of



SUBMARINE B 11,
Which torpedoed the Turkish Battleship "Messudiyeh" in the Dardanelles.



CLEARING FOR ACTION.

All spare wood and furniture is thrown overboard or sent ashore.

the Russian flagship. Also, she was apparently caught napping, as the Russian, who kept the better look-out, got in the first blow. At the range indicated the Goeben's guns should have made a smashing reply, but they evidently failed to do so, while the shells of her antagonists seem to have done her considerable damage. Subsequently she appeared off Batum, but from the fact that she was quickly driven off by the shore batteries it may be inferred that her big guns had not all been repaired, or replaced, since the engagement near Sebastopol.

On December 13 the British submarine B11, Lieutenant-Commander Norman D. Holbrook, entered the Dardanelles, and, diving under five rows of mines, torpedoed the Turkish battleship *Messudiyeh*, which was guarding the minefield. Although pursued by gunfire and torpedo boats, B11 returned safely, after being submerged on one occasion for nine hours. When

last seen the *Messudiyeh* was sinking by the stern. What was not known at the time, and what is nevertheless the fact, is that during the operations the compass of B11 went wrong, and Lieutenant Holbrook had to find his way out of the Dardanelles without it; at one time his frail vessel was actually bumping on the bottom. All his brother officers concur in regarding this as one of the finest individual feats performed during the war. The underwater navigation of the Dardanelles is most perilous and difficult at all times, owing to the swift currents which never cease racing through the Straits, and when, in addition to the whirlpools and eddies caused by these currents striking projections and points, the presence of five rows of mines is considered, such a feat would seem quite impossible of accomplishment were it not for the hard and undeniable fact that it was accomplished. That the torpedoed battleship was "guarding the minefield" adds a touch of comedy to the proceedings that must have been singularly gratifying to Lieutenant Holbrook and his gallant companions who crept along the sea floor with him on that eventful day. The *London Gazette* of December 21 announced that the King had approved of the grant of the Victoria Cross to Lieutenant Norman Douglas Holbrook; his second in command, Lieutenant Sydney Thornhill Winn, being made a Companion of the Distinguished Service Order for his share in the achievement.


BRITISH LOSSES IN HOME WATERS.

About this period several naval losses in home waters have to be chronicled. On the last day of October the old cruiser *Hermes*, Captain C. R. Lambe, was sunk in the Straits of Dover by a German submarine as she was returning from Dunkirk. She was struck by two torpedoes and immediately began to settle down. The S.O.S. signal was made, and two destroyers and the cross-Channel steamer *Invicta* came to the rescue. She remained afloat for about two hours after being struck and then foundered, her captain being the last man to leave her. About 44 of her crew were lost, 400 being saved and landed at Dover. On November 11 the torpedo-gunboat *Niger*, Lieutenant-Commander A. P. Moore, was torpedoed by a submarine in the Downs and foundered. There was no loss of life, and, curiously enough, the occurrence was witnessed by thousands of people at Deal, who had assem-

bled on the beach on hearing the sound of heavy firing out to sea. About noon the sound of an explosion was heard and volumes of black smoke were seen rising from the Niger, which was lying two miles from the shore opposite to the pier head. A stiff breeze was blowing with a considerable sea. Instantly the Deal and Kingsdown lifeboats put out, together with a swarm of boats from the shore, and by these the crew were rescued. The Niger sank about twenty minutes after the explosion.

On November 24 the Secretary of the Admiralty reported the sinking of the German submarine U18 on the northern coast of Scotland. At 12.20 on the morning of the preceding day a British patrolling vessel reported having rammed her, but she was not sighted again until 1.20, when she was seen on the surface, crew on deck, and flying a white flag. Shortly afterwards she foundered just as the destroyer Garry came alongside and rescued three officers and 23 of her crew, only one being drowned. The survivors were landed and interned in Edinburgh Castle.

A terrible disaster occurred at Sheerness on November 26, the Bulwark, a battleship of 15,000 tons, being blown up and destroyed, with the loss of all her company of some 750 officers and men, save fourteen. Many theories were advanced to explain the blowing up of the magazines of the ship, but it remained after all an impenetrable mystery. Lieutenant Benjamin George Carroll, assistant




GERMAN WARSHIP COALING AT SEA.

coaling officer at Sheerness, in his evidence at the coroner's inquest, said that he was passing down the Medway at 7.50 a.m. on the morning of



GUNS OF H.M.S. "NEW ZEALAND."



THE SINKING OF THE BLÜCHER.

["Times" copyright]

the 26th. The Bulwark was then lying in Rithole Reach, and there was nothing alongside her. Just as he was noticing a signal indicating the number of tons of coal on board her he saw a spurt of flame abaft the after barrette. Then the whole volume of flame seemed to rush towards the after funnel. The whole interior of the ship seemed to be blown into the air, and everything seemed alight. He observed no disturbance of the water. It was quite calm, and there was no tide. He at once turned his boat back to render assistance, and was able to pick up two men, including an officer. He was convinced that there was an internal explosion. The 12-inch charges were in brass cases, and he did not see how possibly the throwing away of cigarette ends could have anything to do with the explosions. The Admiralty Court of Inquiry which made an exhaustive and scientific research into the causes of the disaster, could not account for it by any known theory; one of their witnesses, Commander Wilton, said that they had been able to trace every cartridge on board, and there was no evidence of loose cordite. The only definite conclusion arrived at was that the ignition which had taken place was internal and not external.

The first day of the New Year was marked by the loss of the *Formidable*, a battleship of 15,000 tons, which was torpedoed and sunk in the Channel. Completed in 1901, she was virtually a sister-ship to the *Bulwark*, and although pre-Dreadnought battleships are now obsolescent they have still a considerable fighting value, and it would be folly to underestimate the loss that her destruction meant to the Fleet. She went down between 3 and 3.30 a.m., and of her complement of nearly 800 only 201 were saved. After she was struck everything was done that was possible in the circumstances, and that high standard of discipline which never fails in the Navy in the face of serious emergency was fully maintained. Captain Loxley was on the bridge directing operations to the last and went down with the ship. Of the four boats launched, one, a barge, capsized, and several men were thrown into the sea; the second, also a barge, got away with about seventy men, who were picked up by a light cruiser; the third, a pinnace with some sixty men, reached the shore at Lyme Regis, and the fourth, a cutter with seventy men, after being in a rough sea for about eleven hours, was rescued off Berry Head by the




[Russell.]

REAR-ADMIRAL THE HON. H. L. HOOD

trawler *Providence* and brought into Brixham.

The splendid behaviour of the master of this trawler, William Pillar, and his crew, was the one bright spot in the tragedy. They were some fifteen miles from Berry Head, and running before a gale to shelter in Brixham when they were amazed to see an open boat adrift. This turned out to be the cutter of the *Formidable*. Only a seaman can appreciate the difficulties with which Pillar was now confronted. He had, in heavy weather, to take in another reef in his mainsail and to hoist a storm jib; otherwise he could not have brought his vessel to the wind and so manoeuvred as to get into touch with the cutter. By superb handling and entire disregard of danger, he actually managed to gybe his vessel in his endeavour to establish communication with the cutter (this means passing stern to the wind from one tack to the other, and is most dangerous in heavy weather), and at last a rope was passed and made fast. One by one the mariners of the *Formidable* leapt from the open boat to the smack, and when the transfer was at last accomplished the boat was cast off and the *Providence* made for Brixham. The officer of the cutter commended the gallant seamanship of the Brixham fishermen, which he described as being beyond all praise, and the King, when he pinned the silver medal for gallantry on the breast of the skipper, Pillar, at Buckingham Palace, addressed him and his crew in the following words: "I congratulate




THE "BLÜCHER."

you most heartily upon your gallant and heroic conduct. It is indeed a great feat to have saved seventy-one lives. I realize how difficult your task must have been because I know myself how arduous it is to gybe a vessel in a heavy gale." This was not only the King of England speaking to a Brixham fisherman, but also one seaman speaking to another; and to have been thus addressed must have enhanced the value of their well-earned medals to the crew of the Providence. An Admiralty award of £250 was made to Pillar, £100 each to the mate and seaman, and £50 to the boy.

There was at first some doubt whether the loss of the Formidable was due to a submarine or to a mine, but subsequently the Admiralty

came to the definite opinion that she was sunk by two torpedoes fired from a submarine. In this connexion Lord Charles Beresford remarked in the House of Commons on February 15 that :

the submarine was considerably overrated if proper precaution was taken against it, but if such precaution was not taken, it was a most fatal weapon in naval warfare. It was problematical whether a submarine would ever hit a ship going at speed; certainly, it would never hit ships accompanied by their proper quota of destroyers and small craft. These were the two safeguards. He wanted to know why the squadron, of which the Formidable formed part, disposed of them. It was common knowledge where she was going, and what she was going to do. She went out and then sent back the destroyers, which were her first defence. Afterwards, when she was farther out in the Channel, in an area known to be infested with submarines, she slackened speed. The Admiral would not have done that if the Admiralty had given definite orders after the loss of



THE "BLÜCHER" SINKING

(From an actual photograph.)

the three cruisers (Aboukir, Cressy, and Hogue) that no ship should proceed except at speed and with her screens.

RAIDS AND COUNTER-RAIDS.

We now come to the series of raids made on our East Coast by the German Navy. The first, on November 3, was directed against Yarmouth. This place has been persistently described in the German Press as "the fortified port of Yarmouth"—in order, it is to be imagined, that the subjects of the Kaiser may think that special daring was necessary to attack so redoubtable a fortress. The story of this raid has already been dealt with (Vol. II., pp. 358-362); there is, therefore, no occasion to make more than passing reference to it here. In it eight ships were employed, including the three battle cruisers, Seydlitz, Moltke, and Von der Tann, the armoured cruisers Blücher and Yorck, and the cruisers Kolberg, Graudenz, and Strassburg. They bombarded Yarmouth at such long range that they did no damage; they even failed to do any serious harm to the ancient torpedo gunboat Halcyon, though she should undoubtedly have been sunk. They then turned and fled, dropping mines as they went. The submarine D11 which started in pursuit, struck on one of these and was lost with all her crew save two. Two fishing boats also struck on mines and were lost with fifteen hands. As the cruisers returned to their own waters the Yorck struck on a mine and was lost, carrying with her some 300 men.

The second raid, on December 16, was made on Scarborough, Whitby, and the Hartlepoons. As this, too, has been exhaustively treated in the chapter above referred to, there is no need to do more than record it here, and to note the horror which this cowardly attack caused not only in England, but throughout the whole civilized world. Fog unfortunately prevented a British squadron from coming in contact with the marauders, but a reply was delivered on Christmas morning, when a combined attack was made on the German warships lying in Cuxhaven harbour by seven seaplanes piloted by Flight-Commanders Douglas A. Oliver, Francis E. T. Hewlett, Robert P. Ross, and Cecil F. Milner, Flight-Lieutenants Arnold J. Miley, and Charles H. K. Edmonds, and Flight Sub-lieutenant Vivian Gaskell Blackburn. The attack was delivered at daylight, starting from a point in the vicinity of Heligoland. The seaplanes were escorted by a light cruiser and destroyer force, together



[Symonds, Portsmouth]

CAPTAIN A. S. M. CHATFIELD,
of H.M.S. "Lion."

with submarines. As soon as these ships were seen by the Germans from Heligoland, two Zeppelins, three or four seaplanes and several submarines attacked them. It was necessary for the British ships to remain in the neighbourhood in order to pick up the returning airmen, and a novel combat ensued between the most modern cruisers on the one hand and the enemy aircraft and submarines on the other. By swift manœuvring the enemy submarines were avoided, and the two Zeppelins were easily put to flight by the guns of the Undaunted and Arethusa. The enemy seaplanes succeeded in dropping their bombs near our ships, though without hitting any. The British ships remained for three hours off the enemy coast without being molested by any surface vessels, and safely re-embarked three out of the seven airmen. Three more pilots were picked up later, according to arrangement, by the British submarines which were standing by, their machines being sunk. Flight-Commander Hewlett was missing at the end of the day's operations, but he eventually returned in safety, having been picked up by a Dutch fishing vessel. What damage was done is not known; but the moral effect was great. Cuxhaven, unlike Yarmouth and Scarborough, is very strongly fortified; and shoals make it impossible for a ship to pass up the Elbe without coming within the range of the guns



[Russell, Southsea.]


CAPTAIN LIONEL HALSEY,
of H.M.S. "New Zealand."

mounted there. It will be noticed that the much-vaunted Zeppelins were put to flight almost at once.

In connexion with this counter-raid on Cuxhaven reference may be made to the support that was lent by British warships at sea to the land forces of the Allies on the coast of Belgium. When, established on the coast, the Germans proceeded to make their plans for the capture of Calais, as a preliminary for the destruction of our Fleet and the invasion of our country, they did not reckon on the British Navy taking a hand in the game. As was briefly recorded in a previous chapter, a naval flotilla, including the three monitors which at the outbreak of war were being built in British yards for Brazil, and mounting a large number of powerful long-range guns, was brought into action off the Belgian coast in October in support of the left flank of the Belgian Army. Observation was arranged from the shore by means of naval balloons, and the squadron under Rear-Admiral Hood was able to render the neighbourhood of Nieuport and Westende a "perfect hell of fire and smoke," bombarding the German right and enfilading their lines. Although the enemy replied with heavy guns and sought to damage the attacking ships with submarines, destroyers, and mines, our vessels received only trifling


structural injury, and our casualties throughout were slight. This bombardment was continued intermittently for weeks. On November 23 all points of military significance at Zeebrugge were bombarded, and though the official report stated that the amount of damage done was unknown, there was reason to believe that, at least for the time being, the port was rendered useless as a naval base.

There is a curious resemblance between the work thus done by Admiral Hood in the twentieth century and that accomplished by Admiral Rodney in the eighteenth. On July 3, 1759, Rodney arrived off Havre, which was full of stores, fodder, provisions, field guns, ammunition trains, horses, harness, and small arms, ready for embarkation in hundreds of transports and flat-bottomed boats for the invasion of England by the army under the Duc d'Agulion. Rodney was provided with a number of "bomb vessels," which threw bombs guaranteed to set fire to anything inflammable with which they came into contact. Like our modern Admiral, he was young and full of energy; under him the men worked so splendidly that in one night they had all their bomb vessels in position, and the next day the rain of bombs set fire to and consumed everything which would burn, including the transports and flat



[Russell, Southsea.]

REAR-ADMIRAL OSMOND DE B. BROCK
(in the uniform of a Captain),
of H.M.S. "Princess Royal."



H.M.S. "LION,"
Flagship of Sir David Beatty.

boats. It was said that it took Havre over a century to recover from Rodney's attack.

THE NORTH SEA ACTION.

The third German raid took place on January 24, or rather it should be said was attempted, for the attack was foiled by a British patrolling squadron under Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty. Presumably the intention was to repeat the achievement of December 16, which caused so much delight in Germany, and it has been suggested that the objective was the Tyne, or even the Firth of Forth. In Germany it was spoken of as "an advance in the North Sea," as if it were nothing but a reconnoitring excursion.

A British squadron of battle cruisers and light cruisers with destroyer flotillas was patrolling the North Sea on Sunday morning, January 24, 1915, when at 7.25 a.m. the flash of guns was observed to the south-south-east, and shortly afterwards the light cruiser Aurora reported to Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty that she was engaged with enemy ships. He at once altered the course of his ships to south-south-east, increased his speed to twenty-two knots, and ordered the light cruisers and destroyer flotillas to chase south-south-east in order to get into touch with the enemy and report their movements. Almost immediately reports followed from the Southampton, Arethusa and Aurora, which had anticipated these instructions, that the enemy ships consisted of three battle cruisers, the Blücher, six light cruisers, and a number of destroyers. The British fleet included the battleships Lion,

Tiger, Princess Royal, New Zealand and Indomitable; the light cruisers Southampton, Nottingham, Birmingham, Lowestoft, Arethusa, Aurora and Undaunted, and destroyer flotillas, the last being under Commodore Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt. The following are particulars of the large ships engaged on both sides:


BRITISH.

LION.—Battle cruiser, launched at Devonport 1910, completed 1912. Displacement, 26,350 tons; length, 660 ft.; beam, 88½ ft.; draught, 28 ft.; i.h.p., 75,685;



[Russell, Southsea.]

CAPTAIN HENRY B. PELLY,
of H.M.S. "Tiger."



H.M.S. "IRON DUKE."

From the Painting by C. R. Wylie.

speed, 28.5 knots. Armament: Eight 13.5-inch sixteen 4-inch, four 3-pounders, and five machine guns, and two torpedo tubes. Complement, 980.

TIGER.—Battle cruiser, launched at Clydebank 1913. Displacement, 28,000 tons; length, 660 ft.; beam, 90½ ft.; draught, 28½ ft.; i.h.p., 100,000; speed, 28 knots. Armament: Eight 13.5-inch and twelve 6-inch guns. These particulars are unofficial.

PRINCESS ROYAL.—Battle cruiser, sister ship of the Lion, launched at Barrow 1911 completed 1912. Displacement, 26,350 tons; length, 660 ft.; beam, 88½ ft.; draught, 28 ft.; i.h.p., 76,510; speed, 28.5 knots. Armament: eight 13.5-inch, sixteen 4-inch, four 3-pounder, and five machine guns. Complement, 980.

NEW ZEALAND.—Battle cruiser, built at Govan at the charge of the New Zealand Government, launched 1911, completed 1912. Displacement, 18,800 tons; length, 555 ft.; beam, 80 ft.; draught, 26½ ft.; i.h.p., 46,894; speed, 25 knots. Armament: Eight 12-inch, sixteen 4-inch, four 3-pounder, and five machine guns and two torpedo tubes. Complement, 780.

INDOMITABLE.—Battle cruiser, sister ship of the Invincible and Inflexible, which took part in the action off the Falkland Islands. Launched at Govan 1907, completed 1908. Displacement, 17,250; length, 530 ft.; beam, 78½ ft.; draught, 26 ft.; i.h.p., 41,000; speed, 26 knots. Armament: Eight 12-inch, sixteen 4-inch, and five machine guns and five torpedo tubes. Complement, 780.

GERMAN.


BLÜCHER.—Armoured cruiser, launched at Kiel 1908, completed 1910. Displacement, 15,550 tons; length, 499 ft.; beam, 80½ ft.; draught, 26.2 ft.; i.h.p., 40,000; speed, 25.3 knots. Armament: Twelve 8.2-inch, eight 5.9-inch, and sixteen 3.4-inch guns, and four torpedo tubes.

MOLTKE.—Battle cruiser, sister ship of the Goeben, launched at Hamburg 1910, completed 1911. Displacement, 22,640 tons; length, 610½ ft.; beam, 96 ft.; draught, 27 ft.; i.h.p., 86,900; speed, 28.4 knots. Armament: Ten 11-inch, twelve 5.9-inch, and twelve 3.4-inch guns, and four torpedo tubes. Complement, 1,013.

SEYDLITZ.—Battle cruiser, launched at Hamburg 1912, completed 1913. Displacement, 24,640 tons; length, 656 ft.; beam, 93½ ft.; draught, 27 ft.; i.h.p., 65,000; speed, 26.2 knots (best recent speed, 29 knots). Armament: ten 11-inch, twelve 5.9-inch, and twelve 3.4-inch guns, and four torpedo tubes. Complement, 1,108.

DERFFLINGER.—Battle cruiser, launched at Hamburg 1913. Displacement, 28,000 tons; length, 700 ft.; beam, 96 ft.; draught, 27 ft.; i.h.p., 100,000; speed, 27 knots. Armament: Eight 12-inch, twelve 5.9-inch, and twelve 3.4-inch guns, and four torpedo tubes. All the turrets of the Derfflinger are stated to be in the centre line, and not superimposed; otherwise the vessel has much the same outline as the Seydlitz.

When the enemy ships were first seen they were steering north-west, but they quickly changed their course to south-east. The British battle cruisers, working up to their full speed, steered to the southward. At 7.30 they sighted the enemy on the port bow about 14 miles distant and steaming fast, and as the prompt reports they had received had enabled them to attain a position on the enemy's quarter, they altered their course to south-east parallel with that of their quarry, and settled down to a long stern chase. The speed was gradually increased to 28.5 knots, and thanks to the efforts of the engineer staffs of the New



INTERIOR OF A GERMAN SUBMARINE.

The Commander looking through a periscope.

Zealand and Indomitable, those two ships were able to attain a speed greatly in excess of their normal. The result was that the squadron gradually closed to within 20,000 yards of the rear ship (the Blücher) of the enemy, who were in single line-ahead, with their light cruisers ahead and a large number of destroyers on their starboard beam. The first shot was fired by the Lion at 8.52, but fell short, and from that time single shots were fired at intervals to test the range, until at 9.9 the Lion hit the Blücher for the first time. At 8.20 the Tiger, which was following the Lion, had drawn up sufficiently to be able to open fire on the Blücher, and the Lion now turned her attention to the third ship in the German line, which was hit by several salvos at 18,000 yards. The Princess Royal, in turn getting within range, opened fire on the Blücher, and as this latter ship now began to drop astern somewhat, she became exposed to the guns of the New Zealand, the Princess Royal then shifting her fire to the third ship in the German line and inflicting considerable damage on her. During these operations the British flotilla cruisers and destroyers gradually dropped back from a position broad on the beam of the battle cruisers to the port quarter, so that their smoke might not foul the range, but as the enemy destroyers threatened attack, the Meteor and M destroyer division passed ahead, skilfully handled by Captain the Hon. H. Meade.



GROUP OF GERMAN SAILORS RESCUED FROM THE "BLÜCHER."

About 9.45 the *Lion* was engaging the leading German ship, which was on fire; the *Tiger* had first fired at the same ship, but, when smoke interfered, at the *Blücher*; the *Princess Royal* was engaged with the third German ship, which also was on fire, while the *Blücher*, already showing signs of having suffered severely, was also the mark of the *New Zealand*. The enemy's destroyers were now emitting vast quantities of smoke to screen their battle cruisers, which appeared to alter their course to the northward, with the object of increasing their distance; the rear ships, according to Sir David Beatty's dispatch, certainly hauled out on the port quarter of their leader, and thus increased their distance from the British line. To meet this manoeuvre our battle cruisers were ordered to form a line bearing north-north-west and to proceed at their utmost speed. The German destroyers then giving evidence of an attempted attack, the *Lion* and *Tiger* opened fire on them, causing them to retire and resume their original course. The light cruisers, maintaining their position on the port quarter of the enemy line, were able to observe and keep touch, or to attack any vessel that fell out of line.

The *Blücher*, which by this time had dropped considerably astern of her companions, was seen to be on fire, to have a heavy list, and to be

apparently in a defeated condition. As she hauled out to port and steered north the *Indomitable* was ordered to break to the north and attack. A few minutes later submarines were reported near the line, and Admiral Beatty, who himself saw the wash of a periscope two points on the starboard bow, at once turned to port. Then the *Lion* suffered an injury which at three minutes past 11 was reported as being incapable of immediate repair, and, in consequence, her course was shaped north-west. Admiral Beatty also found it necessary to transfer his flag to another vessel; accordingly, at 11.20, he called the torpedo boat destroyer *Attack* alongside, and shifting his flag to her at about 11.35, proceeded at full speed to rejoin the squadron. He met them at noon retiring north-north-west.

Boarding the *Princess Royal* at about 12.20 p.m., he learnt from her captain what had happened in his absence since the *Lion* fell out of the line. The *Blücher* had been sunk, and on the vessels that went to rescue her survivors (of whom about 250 were saved) a Zeppelin and a sea-plane endeavoured to drop bombs. The three German battle cruisers had continued their course eastward, in a considerably damaged condition, the *Derfflinger* and the *Seydlitz*, it is believed, suffering in particular.

Undoubtedly, as Sir David Beatty remarked in his preliminary report, the Lion's mishap deprived our ships of a greater victory than that which they actually put to their credit.

It cannot be said that our success was dearly bought. None of our ships was lost. The Lion and the Tiger were both hit, but although the former had to be towed to port by the Indomitable, the material injury to both ships was only such as could be repaired in a comparatively short time. No member of the Lion's crew was killed, but 21 were wounded; on the Tiger one officer, Engineer-Commander Charles G. Taylor, and nine men were killed, and three officers and eight men were injured. On the destroyer Meteor, which also was disabled, three men were killed and two wounded, one of whom died.


Referring to the action in the House of Commons in February, Mr. Churchill said:

The action was not forced, because the enemy, after abandoning their wounded consort, the Blücher, made good their escape into waters infested by their submarines and mines. But this combat between the finest ships in both navies is of immense significance and value in the light which it throws upon rival systems of design and armament and upon relative gunnery efficiency. It is the first test we have ever had, and without depending too much upon it I think it is at once important and encouraging. First of all it vindicates, so far as it goes, the theories of design, and particularly of big-gun armament, always identified with Lord Fisher. The range of the British guns was found to exceed that of the German. Although the German shell is a most formidable instrument of destruction, the bursting-smashing power of the heavier British projectile is

decidedly greater, and—this is the great thing—our shooting is at least as good as theirs. The Navy, while always working very hard—no one except themselves knows how hard they have worked in these years—have credited the Germans with a sort of super-efficiency in gunnery, and we have always been prepared for some surprises in their system of control and accuracy of fire. But there is a feeling after the combat of January 24 that perhaps our naval officers were too diffident in regard to their own professional skill in gunnery.

Then the guns. While the Germans were building 11-inch guns we built 12-inch and 13½-inch guns. Before they advanced to the 12-inch gun we had large numbers of ships armed with the 13.5. It was said by the opposite school of naval force that a smaller gun fires faster and has a higher velocity, and therefore the greater destructive power. Krupp is the master gunmaker in the world, and it was very right and proper to take such a possibility into consideration. Everything that we have learnt, however, so far shows that we need not at all doubt the wisdom of our policy or the excellence of our material.

In Germany the action caused a disappointment even disproportionate to its real naval importance. For some weeks the Press Bureau of the German Admiralty noisily claimed that, at any rate, one British battle cruiser—to say nothing of two or more destroyers—had been sunk. In reality it was seen that, for the time at any rate, even brief and occasional excursions to British waters must be abandoned. It was no longer possible to pretend that the raids on Yarmouth and on Scarborough and the Hartlepoons had been the prelude to greater things. Such enterprises, even while the German cruiser squadron was intact, involved great risk and little profit. Faced by a strength



FUNERAL OF CAPTAIN ERDMANN OF THE "BLÜCHER."



PAY DAY ON BOARD A MAN-OF-WAR.

of even five to four in representative ships a German raiding force could not but retire, and in all the circumstances of January 24—they would have been even less favourable if the squadron had advanced further—the Germans might think themselves fortunate to have escaped with no greater losses.

The German naval authorities now reconsidered the whole situation. They decided, as we shall see in another chapter, to abandon a few more of the rules of civilized warfare, and to threaten British and neutral commerce with indiscriminate extermination by submarines and mines.

